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STATEMENT OF CASE-RELEVANT FACTS-JURISDICTION 
Defendant is an alien.(RT, Page 178, page 7, line 20) English is a 
second language for defendant. On May 18, 1998, there was an incident with 
defendant's estranged husband, Mark J. Grosser, that lead to an information 
that was filed on May 20, 1998, charging defendant with two misdemeanors. 
Count one was an alleged violation of a domestic protective order prohibiting 
defendant, Marha Tarnawiecki, from attempting, committing, or threatening 
to commit abuse or domestic violence, as enumerated in the statement of 
probable cause. Count two was alleged assault.(TC, Pages 1-3) 
On July 17, 1998, defendant pled guilty to count one of the information 
and her plea affidavit was entered that date.(TC, Pages 14-15) Also, on July 
17, 1998, there was a guilty plea colloquy between the trial court and 
defendant.(Reporter's transcript of July 17, 1998) The plea affidavit omitted 
the constitutional and Rule 11 requirements of right to speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, minimum sentence and penalty, and there were no 
foundational facts establishing the prima facie case of attempting, 
committing, or threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence.(TC, Pages 
14-15) The plea colloquy failed to mention the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the minimum sentence and inadequately inquired as 
to the facts underlying count one. Specifically, the trial court only parroted 
i 
that the defendant intentionally violated a protective order, a legal conclusion 
without any underlying facts.(RT, July 17,1998, page 2, lines 17-25) 
Defendant alleges that her criminal defense lawyer was ineffective and 
erroneously urged her to plead guilty because of his lack of preparation, 
investigation and follow up. On September 17,1998, defendant filed a motion 
to extend the time to file and to withdraw her guilty plea.(TC, Pages 27-39,) 
An evidentiary hearing was had on December 29,1998.(RT, Page 178, et. 
seq.) 
On February 8, 1999, the trial court denied the motion to extend and 
withdraw her plea.(RT, Pages 179, et. seq.) On February 18, 1999, the trial 
court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, specifically finding 
that it had no jurisdiction to hear the motion to extend and withdraw because 
of the 30 day limitation. Furthermore, that no further decision as to the merits 
of the motion was necessary.(TC, Pages 163-4) 
On March 10, 1999, defendant filed her Notice of Appeal, challenging 
the denial of the motion to extend the time to file and the motion to withdraw 
her plea.(TC, Pages 156-8) Based on defendant's guilty plea to violation of a 
protective order, defendant has served forty-five days in the county jail and 
INS has filed a deportation hearing that is still pending and scheduled for 
hearing early in January, 2000.(TC, Page 89, et.seq.) 
2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter under the 
provisions of § 78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated, as an appeal by right 
from a court of record in a criminal case based on the denial of a motion to 
extend time to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
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I 
WHERE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IS NOT ADVISED OF HER 
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY PUBLIC TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL 
JURY, HER GUILTY PLEA MUST BE SET ASIDE 
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11, regarding guilty pleas, 
specifically, Rule 11(e)(3), in pertinent part, provides "The court... may not 
accept the plea until the court has found ... (3) the defendant knows of the 
right to the presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, 
the right to confront and cross examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel attendance of defense witnesses, and that by 
entering the plea, these rights are waived;" Utah R. Crim. P., Rule 
11(e)(3). (Emphasis added). 
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11 IS REQUIRED 
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313-14, (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that trial judges are responsible for strict compliance 
with Rule 11(e). "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuing that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with 
when a guilty plea is entered. The basis for that duty is found in Boykin v 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709,1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 
(1969), where the United States Supreme Court stated: 'What is at stake for 
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an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of which the 
courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he 
has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.'" 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah courts have also held that "[it] is critical ... that strict compliance 
be demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty ... plea is entered." State 
v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. Ct. 1991) cert, denied, 836 P.2d 
1383 (1992). Although a rigid colloquy or rote recitation of the elements of 
Rule 11 is not required, see State v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1993); 
State v. Maquire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991); a record of compliance 
with Rule 11(e) must nonetheless be established by multiple means, either a 
plea affidavit or a plea colloquy between the trial court and the defendant, or 
both, at which the trial court must ensure that the defendant's guilty plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. "It is imperative that 'no requirement 
of the rule' [11] be omitted by the trial court." State v. Visser, 973 P.2d. 
998, at 1002 (Utah App. 1999). (Emphasis added) 
Visser, supra, is the latest case regarding the omission to advice of the 
right to a speedy public trial. In Visser, the court held that the trial court 
abused its discretion as a matter of law in not advising defendant, before 
accepting his guilty plea in mid-trial, of his constitutional right to a speedy 
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public trial before an impartial jury. Despite the fact that the trial itself 
presupposed that the defendant had actually been given a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the court reversed the trial court's order denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and remanded to the trial 
court with instructions to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. In 
Visser, supra, at 1002, the court opined: "Our review of the record in this 
case reveals that when the trial court accepted defendant's plea, it: (1) 
failed to inform defendant of his constitutional right to trial by an 
impartial jury; (2) failed to inform defendant of his constitutional right 
to a speedy trial; and (3) failed to ensure defendant understood that, by 
entering his plea, he was waiving these rights." (Emphasis added) 
Since neither the plea affidavit nor the plea colloquy contain any 
reference to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the defendant 
could not waive a right that she did not know about. A waiver is the 
intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Atlas Life Ins. v. 
Schrimsher, 179 Okl. 643, 66 P.2d 944, 948. (1937). Since the defendant 
was never advised of her constitutional and Rule 11 right to a speedy public 
trial before an impartial jury, she could not waive that right. Rule 11 requires 
that the court may not accept the plea of guilty until there has been an 
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advisement of the defendant's constitutional and Rule 11 rights, therefore the 
court never had the power and jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea ab initio. 
The trial court's mistake meets the abuse of discretion and plain error 
tests of appellate review as enumerated in Visser, supra, and State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, at 1208-9 (Utah 1993). Since the defendant extensively 
briefed Rule 11 and it was frequently referred to during the evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court should have been on notice of its applicability to the 
fact pattern. Therefore, by reading Rule 11(e)(3) it should have been obvious 
that the court had a duty to inform the defendant of the right to a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury, before accepting the defendant's plea. 
Without notice of the right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury, the 
lack of such information was critically important in evaluating whether or not 
to go to trial, and affected the case's outcome. 
II 
IF CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IS NOT PROPERLY ADVISED 
OF THE MINIMUM SENTENCE, HER GUILTY PLEA 
MUST BE SET ASIDE 
The trial clerk's record of the plea affidavit (TC, pages 14-15), on page 
two, merely lists in columnar form the headings Offense, Jail, Fine and Plus 
Maximum 85% Surcharge. However there is no reference in the plea affidavit 
to the fact that the minimum sentence may be 0 days in jail and $0.00. There 
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is no conjunction "and" in the plea affidavit Also, there is no mention that 
the punishment of jail time is in the county jail and not state prison. The 
reporter's transcript of July 17,1998, (page 2, lines 9-16) contains the only 
colloquy discussion of the potential sentence and that discussion is limited to 
the maximum penalty. There is no reference to the minimum sentence that 
could be imposed. 
Rule 11(e)(5), in pertinent part, provides: "The court... may not 
accept the plea until the court has found ... (5) the defendant knows the 
minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the minimum 
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offence to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences." Utah R. of Crim. P., Rule 11(e)(5). (Emphasis 
added.) Therefore, because of the failure to advice the defendant of the 
minimum fine and jail time, the defendant's constitutional and Rule 11 rights 
have been violated and the defendant must be allowed to withdraw her guilty 
plea as a matter of law. The omission of the word and in the plea affidavit 
and the lack of any mention of the minimum penalty in the colloquy between 
the trial court and the defendant is fatally defective. 
In State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464, at 466 (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme 
Court held that where neither the plea affidavit nor the trial court clearly 
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explained the possibility of a minimum mandatory sentence to the defendant, 
there were grounds to vacate the guilty plea, since it was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. In State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1990), the 
court vacated the defendant's conviction and remanded to the trial court to 
allow the defendant to withdraw his plea because the trial court failed to 
review the possible punishment with the defendant as required by Rule 
11(e)(5). 
HI 
THERE WAS NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEA IN THE 
PLEA AFFIDAVIT, THE COLLOQUY, OR BOTH AND THE 
DEFENDANT DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND 
ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER 
A trial court must make an inquiry on the record concerning the 
defendant's understanding of the nature and elements of the offense as 
required by Rule 11. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 1 l(e)(4)(A)(B), 
in pertinent part, provides that a court may not accept a guilty plea until: "(A) 
the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of 
proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea 
is an admission of all those elements; (B) there is a factual basis for the plea. 
A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was 
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actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish substantial risk of conviction;" 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a defendant's guilty plea was 
involuntarily made, and the judgment of conviction was entered without due 
process of law in violation of Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7, because 
the judge failed to make any findings on the record that defendant understood 
nature and elements of offense to which he pled guilty and record showed that 
defendant did not understand nature and elements of offense. State v. 
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, (Utah 1984). A trial court must make an 
inquiry on the record concerning the defendant's understanding of the nature 
and elements of the offense as required by Rule 11 .(currently, Rule 
ll(e)(4)(A)(B)). State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, at 777, (Utah App. 1990). 
Failure to inform a defendant of the nature and elements of the offense is fatal 
to a guilty plea conviction. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1314, (Utah 
1987); State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335, (Utah App. 1989); Parroting 
the statutory elements of the crime charged against a defendant is merely a 
legal conclusion and does not establish a factual basis for the plea. Willett v. 
Barnes, 842 P.2d 860, at 862, (Utah 1992); Furthermore, a defendant's 
understanding of the elements of the charges and the relationship of the law to 
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the facts may not be presumed from a silent or incomplete record. State v. 
Smith, 776 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 
92, 95 (Utah App. 1988); State v. Mills, 898 P.2d 819, 824 (Utah App. 
1995). 
Applying the aforementioned law to the facts of this case, the plea 
affidavit (TC, Page 15), on page two, merely recites that "on or about 
May 18,1989 in Salt Lake County, St. of Ut. the [defendant] directly, or 
indirectly communication [communicated] w/ the Petitioner, and mutual 
combat resulted." However, the probable cause statement of the 
information enumerates "The statement of Salt Lake Police Detective Jensen 
that a valid Protective Order issued on April 24, 1998, prohibits the 
defendant, Marha Tarnawiecki from attempting, committing, or 
threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against Mark 
Grosser." (TC, Page 3). 
The plea affidavit only admits that defendant communicated with the 
Petitioner and mutual combat resulted. Since "mutual combat resulted" is a 
mere conclusion and in itself is not a violation of the underlying protective 
order, the fact that mutual combat resulted is legally irrelevant. The plea 
affidavit has no statement alleging who initiated the combat and merely 
recites that the defendant communicated with the Petitioner. Communicating 
n 
with the Petitioner does not legally amount to abuse or domestic violence, as 
alleged in the statement of probable cause. How the defendant communicated 
and what she said are not alleged in the plea affidavit. Mere words without 
more do not constitute assault or abuse. There must be a menacing act 
evincing the intent to cause contact or placing the victim in reasonable 
apprehension of an imminent contact. Whartons, 2 Criminal Law ,15th. Ed, 
428, Section 184. The salient point is that the plea affidavit itself does not 
contain any element of the offense of violation of a protective order involving 
abuse or domestic violence. It merely recites irrelevant conclusionary 
statements without any preliminary facts demonstrating abuse or domestic 
violence. There are no operative or ultimate facts contained in the plea 
affidavit, therefore the plea colloquy between the trial court and the defendant 
needs to be examined. 
The reporter's transcript of the trial court's acceptance of the guilty 
plea on July 17,1998, reveals that the only reference to the elements of the 
prima facie case of violation of a protective order is the following: "If you 
plead guilty to that class A misdemeanor, you are admitting that at 668 East 
Third Avenue in Salt Lake, on or about May 18th, you were the respondent 
subject to a Protective Order that had been issued under the authority of the 
Utah Code and that you intentionally violated that order after having been 
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properly served with it. So there was an Order out that you didn't follow. 
You understand that? Yes" (Transcript of July 17,1998, page 2, lines 17-25, 
in manila folder in appellate court file; July 17,1998 transcript not indexed in 
appellate file). 
The trial court's conclusion that defendant intentionally violated the 
protective order is legally insufficient. That defendant intentionally violated a 
protective order is a mere conclusion of law without any underlying necessary 
foundational facts. What defendant did to intentionally violate the order is not 
stated by the trial judge. Parroting the statutory elements of the crime, as the 
trial judge did here, is merely stating a legal conclusion. Willett v. Barnes, 
842 P.2d 860, at 862 (Utah 1992). A defendant's understanding of the 
elements of the charges and the relationship of the law to the facts may not be 
presumed from a silent or incomplete record. State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929 
(Utah App. 1989). Clearly, since there are no foundational facts establishing 
intent, the trial judge's inquiry is insufficient. There are no ultimate facts 
stated, therefore the facts are not related to the law, as required. The trial 
court fails to meet the minimum standards as set out in Rule 11 and the case 
law. In fact, it does not come close to the standards set out. 
IV 
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INEFFECTIVE REPRESENTION DEPRIVED DEFENDANT 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER U.S. 
AND STATE OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONS 
Ineffective counsel was raised in the trial court but was not decided, 
since the trial court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to hear that issue because 
of State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, at 583 (Utah App. 1992) (TC, Page 161, 
Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 1 and 2) Therefore, a reviewing court is free 
to make an independent determination whether U.S. Constitution sixth 
amendment right to counsel, incorporated and made binding on the states via 
the fourteenth due process clause, and Article I, Section 12 of the State of 
Utah Constitution have been satisfied. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, at 
186[2] (Utah 1990). The trial record is more than adequate to permit an 
independent appellate evaluation of the performance of counsel. State v. 
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
To demonstrate constitutionally ineffective representation, a defendant 
must establish that (1) her counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) but for her counsel's 
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
would have been different. Strictland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
694,104 S.Ct. 2052,2064, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
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outcome." State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, at 187 (quoting Strictland, 466 
U.S. at 694,104 S.Ct. at 2068). 
The test for reasonableness of the totality of counsel's representation is 
not a hard and fast rule, but rather "the proper measure of attorney 
performance remains simply reasonableness under the prevailing norms ... 
The purpose is simply to insure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial." 
Strictland, supra, at 688-9. The determination of whether deficient 
performance affected the outcome must be made by considering "the totality 
of the evidence [and] taking into account such factors as whether errors affect 
the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how strongly the 
verdict is supported by the record." Templin, supra, at 187, citing 
Strictland, at 696. 
It is the totality of nonfeasance and misfeasance and that the errors are 
of such critical importance, which is so striking in the instant case. Also, the 
amount of error demonstrates a pattern of deficient investigation and 
preparation. In fact, the lack of diligence is woven throughout the fabric of 
counsel's representation. In Utah, under the cumulative error doctrine, the 
court will reverse if the "... cumulative effect of several [otherwise harmless] 
errors undermines our confidence ... that a fair trial was had." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201,1229 (Utah 1993) Quoting Whitehead v. American Motors 
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Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990). Also, see State v. Perez, 924 
P.2d 1,2 at footnote 3 (Utah 1996). 
ATTORNEY FAILED TO DISCOVER, CONSIDER, 
INVESTIGATE, PREPARE AND RESEARCH OBVIOUS 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, VIABLE DEFENSES AND DEFECTS 
IN PROSECUTION'S CASE 
In the trial court brief, Defendant's Closing Synopsis Brief And 
Closing Argument, (TC, Pages 124-7, inclusive) defendant enumerated 
eighteen errors of counsel. Additionally, numerous other critically important 
egregious errors will be discussed herein and but for counsel's deficient 
performance the outcome would have been different. That is, the defendant 
would not have entered a guilty plea, but would have elected to go to trial. 
Two glaring examples of deficient performance literally jump out from 
the very inception of the criminal case. Count 1 of the Domestic Violation 
Information states, (TC, Page 1) in pertinent part, that the defendant-
respondent, Marha Tarnawiecki, is subject to a protective order or ex parte 
protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6 and did intentionally violate 
that order after having been properly served with it. From page two of the 
information's probable cause statement (TC, Page 2), it is clear that 
defendant is alleged to have violated a protective order of attempting, 
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committing, or threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against 
Mark Grosser, dated April 24,1998. In fact, there is no protective order 
dated April 24,1998; however, there is a protective order dated April 24, 
1996. In other words, the attorney failed to recognize and object to count one 
of the information, which had the wrong date. Although a motion to amend or 
interlineate would probably been granted, the omission reflects a pattern of 
lack of diligence, preparation and carelessness. 
More importantly, the Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, Title 30-6-
6(5) in pertinent part, states: "Each protective order and ex parte protective 
order ... to refrain from abusing the plaintiff [Mark Grosser] SHALL 
CONSPICUOUSLY BEAR THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: 
"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE 
CONSTITUTING A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, CARRYING 
PENALTIES OF FINE AND IMPRISONMENT. Since the actual notice 
warning in the protective order states: "RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF 
THIS ORDER WILL CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. NEITHER 
PARTY MAY IGNORE OR ALTER THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER", the 
omission of "carrying penalties of fine and imprisonment" and that the 
violation is "a class A misdemeanor" are fatally defective; ergo, there can be 
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no abuse. Based on the legislature's intent, it seems clear that without the 
magic words of notice and warning, there can be no violation of Title 30-6. 
Not noticing and raising the issue is unreasonable, since the attorney stated 
that he read the protective order. (RT, Page 178, page 23, lines 16-23, 
inclusive) However, the did not bother to check the notice and warning 
language in the protective order against the actual wording of Title 30-6-6(5) 
nor did he notice that the date was April 24, 1996, not 1998. 
The pattern of lack of preparation and investigation is further 
highlighted by the following: the attorney knew that intent, self-defense, and 
who was the aggressor was in issue; defendant told him she had called the 
police to assist and she had to call them twice; Kathy Shepherd had told her 
what to do(TC, Pages 130-133); there were eye witnesses to the incident that 
occurred at the mother's house; defendant had been taken to the hospital from 
the scene; the defendant was an alien who might face deportation, and 
defendant believed that Mr. Grosser was about to immediately remove the 
parties minor child from the State of Utah, yet he failed to reasonably 
investigate and follow up on each of these factors. (RT, Page 178, dated 
December 29, 1998) The evidentiary purpose and value of each of these 
errors is to show the totality and pattern of lack of preparation, undermining 
the confidence in the outcome and its lack of fairness to the defendant. 
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With regard to intent, numerous critical errors and omissions occurred. 
Violation of a protective order requires an intentional act and assault also 
requires intent to cause or create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
See Utah Code, Ann. 1953, as amended, 30-6-6 and 76-5-102(l)(c), 
respectively. 
The following factors would tend to show that defendant did not have 
the requisite intent: 1) she initially called the police and asked them to meet 
her at the scene (dispatch tape and evidentiary hearing testimony-RT, Page 
178, page 6, lines 5-10, inclusive, and pages 15-17, lines 16-24, 1-24 and 1-3, 
respectively), 2) there was a police dispatch tape to corroborate her version, 
3) there was an existing order prohibiting the parties from removing the minor 
child from the State of Utah, 4) defendant believed that Mark Grosser was 
about to immediately remove the child from the jurisdiction of the court, 5) 
defendant waited at the house for the police to arrive, and 6) when they did 
not arrive promptly she called them again,(TC, Page 24) 7) Kathy Shepherd, 
the paralegal of her then domestic lawyer, had told defendant the day of the 
incident, if it were her child she would immediately take the child into her 
protective custody, [See Kathy Shepherd affidavit(TC, Pages 130-33) 
attached to trial brief and used to show the state of mind of defendant at or 
about the time of the incident] 8) Mr. Grosser had struck her first and 9) she 
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kicked him back as a reflexive self-defensive act and 10) there were records 
and persons who could verify her side of the conflicting contentions. 
All of aforementioned factors had evidentiary value in that they tend to 
show that defendant did not have the requisite intent. However, counsel failed 
to investigate and follow up said salient evidence, demonstrating his overall 
pattern of faulty preparation. The evidence ameliorates and tends to show that 
the requisite mens rea requirement of both counts of the information could be 
rebutted and the prosecution cannot prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt. For example, the police dispatch tape was a foundational piece of 
evidence that would have tended to show that defendant did not have the 
intent to violate the protective order, since she placed calls, one before she 
arrived at the scene and one after she was at the scene, seeking police 
intervention to prevent Mark Grosser from immediately removing the minor 
child from the State of Utah contrary to an existing court order of no removal. 
Yet, counsel admits that he failed to obtain and listen to the tape before he 
recommended that defendant plead guilty and the guilty plea was entered. He 
finally went to the police department, a day before sentencing or on the day of 
sentencing, and after hearing the tape, (which corroborated defendant's 
version) he did not consider nor file a motion to withdraw the plea, which 
was well within the 30 day limitation period. (RT, Page 178, pages 6, lines 5-
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10, and page 15, lines 3-5, 10-11, 16-24; page 16, lines 1-24; page 17, lines 
1-24; page 18, lines 1-17) Although a criminal specialist, he did not consider 
the 30-day limitation rule, placing his client in an untenable position that was 
tantamount to a permanent waiver, except for exploring the deficiencies via 
ineffective counsel. 
The pattern of inadequate preparation and lack of diligence is 
ubiquitous since the attorney failed to: interview the eyewitness; personally 
speak to the mother, who was at the scene; obtain an affidavit or statement 
from Kathy Shepherd, which would have tended to rebut the intent 
prerequisite element of intent; (RT, Page 178, page 33, lines 6-19, Kathy 
Shepherd; page 37, lines 5-7and 15, eyewitnesses;) 
The insufficiencies of counsel are continued in not preparing the self-
defense issue and who initiated the contact. Initially, the defendant told 
counsel that she had called the police, Mr. Grosser was the aggressor and 
initiated the contact between the parties, and she had kicked him back as a 
reflexive act of self-defense. (RT, Page 178, page 6, lines 2-10; page 23, lines 
10-15) Counsel admits that there were many witnesses who he could have 
interviewed and used to establish the fact that Mark Grosser struck first, but 
he failed to interview any of them, although many of them would have been 
extremely important. (RT, Page 178, page 48, lines 19-24) 
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The attorney's failure to interview any of the witnesses placed him in a 
position that he could not properly evaluate the impact of URE, Rule 404, 
and, via his own admission, there were many witnesses available to interview 
for that purpose. 
The lack of investigation of obvious salient exculpatory and 
corroborative evidence, placed the attorney in the position of being unable 
to properly evaluate the strength or weakness of the prosecution's case, and 
properly advise his client whether or not to plead guilty, which is vital in 
evaluating the totality of the performance of counsel. Counsel's ineptitude 
and lack of investigation placed himself, and his client, in the untenable 
position that there could not be a proper evaluation of the State's offer on 
July 2, 1998 (Pre-trial date) and July 17, 1998. (Entry plea date) 
UNREASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY OF DEFICIENT 
COUNSEL CAUSED UNREASONABLE EMPHASIS ON 
BOGUS THREAT OF FELONY ENHANCEMENT 
It seems clear that Mr. Archuleta testified that the threat of 
enhancement to a felony pursuant to Utah Criminal Code 76-5-109.1 was 
given to him one time only (RT, Page 178, page 40, line 8) and that it was 
Deputy Kevin Murphy who told him of that threat; and it was at the pre-trial 
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conference on July 2, 1998. (RT, Page 178, page 40, lines 18-24) It is 
incontroverted that the attorney felt the threat backed him in the corner 
and had an unsettling affect on the defendant. (RT, Page 178, page 19, lines 
5-6, 8-9) 
Therefore, the issue is whether that trial strategy was unreasonable, 
taking into account the totality of the evidence and circumstances at the time 
the decision was made? In the words of Strickland, supra, at 690,691, 
"strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant 
to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made 
after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent 
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary.'5 (emphasis added) 
Since the threat came on July 2, 1998, but the plea was not entered 
until July 17, 1998, there were over two weeks for counsel to read and 
evaluate 76-5-109.1. Certainly, he had an affirmative duty to read the section 
to determine if the prosecution's threat was bogus or real. Utah Criminal 
Code 76-5-109.1(2)(3), in pertinent part, states: 
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"(2) A person is guilty of child abuse if he: (a)commits or attempts to commit 
criminal homicide, as defined in section 76-5-201, against a cohabitant in the 
presence of a child; or (b)intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a 
cohabitant or uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury against a 
cohabitant, in the presence of a child; or (c) under circumstances not 
amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b), commits an act of 
domestic violence in the presence of a child after having committed: (i) a 
violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) on one or more prior occasions; or (ii) an 
act of domestic violence in the presence of a child, not amounting to a 
violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b), on one or more prior occasions. (3) (a) A 
person who violates Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is guilty of a third degree felony, 
(b) A person who violates Subsection (2)(c) is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor." 
Since only Subsection (2)(a) or (b) are felonies and (c) is a 
misdemeanor, only Subsection (2)(a) or (b) need to be analyzed. Subsection 
(2)(a) is inapplicable since it involves criminal homicide, therefore Subsection 
(2)(b) is the only possible relevant applicable section. Since serious bodily 
injury is required in Subsection (2)(b) and only a reflexive kick to the 
buttocks was involved in the instant fact pattern, Subsection (2)(b) is 
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inapplicable to the defendant's scenario. Also, Mr. Grosser and the defendant 
were not cohabitants at the time of the alleged incident and at any other 
relevant time. In short, there is no factual basis for a felony pursuant to 76-5-
109.1 and all counsel had to do was to read the section to discover that fact. 
He clearly did not bother to read the section or if he did, he unreasonably and 
deficiently did not properly evaluate the applicability of the relevant section. 
Therefore, he made an unreasonable deficient trial strategy decision and 
pursuant to Strickland, supra at 691, he made an unreasonable decision 
based on his unreasonable lack of preparation. Additionally, the cumulative 
effect of his lack of preparation of the aforementioned areas of intent and self-
defense left the attorney, and his client, in the position where they did not 
have the foundational data to properly evaluate whether or not the 
prosecution's offer was acceptable or not. The unreasonable defective 
performance deprived his client of the opportunity of a fair adversarial day in 
court. Clearly, there was prejudice suffered by the defendant because there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result would have been different, and the defendant would not have entered a 
guilty plea. Strickland, supra at 703. Therefore, there was no reasonable trial 
strategy decision and prejudice resulted. 
The attorney had a duty to consider the case from three aspects: 
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1) The most favorable criminal disposition, 2) the most favorable custody 
disposition and 3) the most favorable immigration disposition. He failed to 
properly investigate and prepare any of these three aspects of the case. He 
had only a brief discussion with the divorce lawyer Brad Parsons. He did not 
properly advise his client as to the impact of a protective order violation as it 
impacted the pending custody case. Lastly, the act of referring the case to 
immigration expert Ishola, and then not following up that aspect. The 
admission of no follow-up tends to show that the overall pattern was one of 
lack of diligence, preparation and investigation. The evidence of the 
immigration consequences is admissible for the limited purpose of showing 
another lack of preparation in a total scheme of unpreparedness. (RT, Page 
178, pages 29-30, lines 12-24 and 1-15, respectively) 
The attorney's enumeration in the plea affidavit, in the statement of 
specific comprising elements of each offense, is a further example of the 
attorney's deficient performance. He did not even know that the protective 
order violation was attempting, committing, or threatening to commit abuse or 
domestic violence, not directly or indirectly communicating with the 
Petitioner. Mark Grosser. 
The evidentiary hearing transcript is filled with nearly ninety 
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pages of the inadequacy of counsel. There is an imbalance of what was done 
reasonably and what was done unreasonably. An accurate point of view 
question might ask- What, if anything, did counsel do that was reasonable? 
Seemingly, very little. The attorney's own assessment of his own 
performance was that "I think that ineffective assistance of Counsel, failure to 
advise the client of the time limits. I think all those are sufficient grounds for 
the purposes of setting the plea aside beyond the 30 day period, all of which I 
did not do."(RT, Page 178, page 56, lines 6-12) 
It is uncontroverted that defendant testified that Mr. Archuleta told her 
that she would not be deported. He said the reasons were that she had a child 
born in America, she was married to an American citizen, and there was a 
child evaluation going on at the present time. He said that deportation would 
constitute a violation of her rights to due process. 
Further, he said, at the time that she came to the entry of the plea on 
July 17, that a felony for sure would constitute deportation, but not a 
misdemeanor. And that a misdemeanor is nothing. If it were a felony the INS 
would go and find her, but not if it was a misdemeanor. And when she asked 
him why he knew that he said he just knew, as a criminal lawyer he knew 
that. (RT, Page 178, page 85, lines 16-24; page 86, lines 1-12) One purpose 
of the aforementioned testimony is to show that wrong advice was given to 
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the defendant, bringing her within the exception to State v. McFadden, 884 
P.2d 1303, at 1305, footnote 3. The exception is that the giving of erroneous 
advice regarding deportation is not within the ambit of the collateral 
consequence doctrine. 
In summary, the total number of errors establish that the cumulative 
errors doctrine is applicable, and the harmful errors resulted in substantial 
prejudice to the defendant. Ineffective counsel resulted in extreme prejudice 
as well, and neither doctrine is subject to the 30-day limitation rule. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. TITLE 77-13-6 VIOLATES DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF STATE OF UTAH AND U.S. 
CONSTITUTIONS ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-13-6 states: "77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. (2) 
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of court, (b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest is made by motion and shall be made within 30 days after 
the entry of the plea. (3) This section does not restrict the rights of an 
imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(Emphasis added) 
The 30-day time limitation must be read and construed in conjunction 
with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Price, 837 
P.2d 578, at 582 (Utah App. 1992). Rule 11(e)(7) states that the court may 
not accept the plea until the court has found the defendant has been advised 
of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw the plea. Rule 11(f) 
provides that failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for the filing 
any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill 
is not a ground for setting aside the plea aside, but may be a ground for 
extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-13-6. Section 77-13-
6(2)(b) is a jurisdictional rule and after a proper advisement in the trial court, 
30 days after the entry of the plea, the defendant's rights are forever 
extinguished, waived and barred. Price, supra, at 583-4. 
The actual words used in the plea affidavit are different from the 
language enumerated in 77-13-6. Instead of using the word "shall", indicating 
the mandatory nature of the statute, the plea states the defendant has a right to 
withdraw her plea AS LONG AS the request is in writing and for good cause 
shown. (TC, Page 15, last paragraph on page) The clause beginning "as long 
as" is misplaced in the sentence and comes after the 30 day admonishment, 
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creating ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion. Furthermore, the warning 
notice fails to inform the defendant that after the 30 day period her rights are 
forever extinguished. 
The issues raised are whether failure to advise the defendant of the 
consequence that after 30 days her rights are forever extinguished is fatally 
defective, and whether the words "as long as" created ambiguity, confusion 
and uncertainly, resulting in improper advisement of the rights of defendant? 
The word "shall", as used in 77-13-6, is mandatory not discretionary 
language. If a written motion to withdraw for good cause is not filed within 
30 days from the entry of the guilty plea, the defendant's right to bring the 
motion is forever extinguished. Price, supra. Although the word "shall" 
usually is construed to be mandatory, there are cases that hold that such 
wording may be permissive in certain instances. In analyzing the contention 
whether shall is mandatory language, it is pertinent to observe that the term 
"shall" is a flexible one. This is clearly revealed by reference to that 
comprehensive lexicon of the law, Words and Phrases. It contains numerous 
pages of case references to the word "shall," a perusal of which indicates that 
it is sometimes used in the mandatory sense and sometimes merely as 
directory or permissive, leading to the conclusion that its meaning is to be 
determined from the context in which it is used and the purpose sought to be 
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accomplished. See Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, at 
1342. (Utah 1982) 
In Utah, where there is an unequivocal legislative intent to have a 
failure to comply stand as a bar to further action, the statutory notice 
requirement is mandatory. Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 
480,482 (Utah 1980) Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Utah 
1976); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972); Peterson v. 
Salt Lake City, 221 P.2d 591 (Utah 1950). It seems axiomatic that "shall" as 
used in 77-13-6 is mandatory language, therefore the trial court had an 
affirmative duty to bring home to the defendant that after 30 days her rights 
were forever extinguished. Instead, to the contrary, the trial court created 
ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion when it used the words "as long as", 
presumptively in place of "shall". The defendant respectfully submits that the 
aforementioned terms are not equivalent or synonymous. In fact, the terms are 
very dissimilar. 
A perusal of Words and Phrases reveals that "as long as" is used far 
less frequently than "shall", and that when used the equivalents are "while", 
"during", and "until". The term "as long as" is generally a word of art. Used 
in a lease, they are words of limit and "while", "until" and "during" has been 
held equivalents of the term "as long as". Vanatta v. Brewer, 32 N.J. Eq. 
31 
268, 270. Contracts, leases, deeds and real property interests are contexts in 
which the term is most frequently used. In Lindsay v. Wigal, 250 N.E.2d 
755, at 757 (1969), the court held that "as long as" were words of art creating 
a determinable fee with a possibility of reverter. If not intended as words of 
art, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, defines "as" 
and states: "to the same degree or amount: to such extent: equally". It is clear 
that as a word of art or in the common ordinary meaning of the words, "as 
long as" and "shall" are neither equivalents nor synonymous terms. 
The question then narrows to whether the following sentence in the 
plea affidavit is adequate notice and advisement to the defendant of the 30-
day rule and its consequences? "I understand that I have a right to 
withdraw this plea within 30 days of today's date as long as the request 
is in writing and for good cause shown." (TC, Page 15). The trial judge did 
not mention the 30-day rule in the colloquy of July 17, 1998, and Mr. 
Archuleta testified that he did not specifically remember advising the 
defendant about the 30-day rule. (RT, Page 178, page 42, lines 15-20). 
Therefore, the only admonishment to defendant was the aforementioned 
sentence in the plea affidavit. Defendant contends that the sentence is 
insufficient notice of the 30 day limitation since it creates ambiguity and 
confusion, and fails to advice the defendant that a direct consequence of 
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failure to comply with the 30 day rule results in a permanent bar and 
extinguishment of her right. The language of 77-13-6 and the verbiage used in 
the plea affidavit are substantially different from one another. 
The plea affidavit conveyed an erroneous, confusing and different 
meaning than the legislative intended in creating the 30-day limitation of 77-
13-6. Furthermore, the omission to advise defendant of the consequences that 
failure resulted in the extinguishment of that right forever, violated the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the State of Utah and U.S. 
Constitutions, as applied to this defendant. A proper advisement would have 
stated that "I understand that I have a right to withdraw this plea only if the 
request is in writing for good cause shown and filed within 30 days after the 
entry of this plea" or "I understand that I have a right to withdraw this plea 
only if the request is in writing for good cause shown and filed within 30 
days after the entry of this plea or that right is forever extinguished." 
Since the penalty for not filing within the 30-day period is extremely 
drastic, the duty of the trial court to clearly admonish and explain the 
consequences is greater than if this were not a jurisdictional statute. It takes 
only a very short time to correctly state the rule and explain the consequences 
of failure. The consequence is direct and substantial where the defendant does 
not act, therefore the court has a duty to completely and properly advise the 
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defendant of said impact. For example, a court has the duty to advise the 
defendant of the penalty and sentence that could be imposed for violation of 
the particular law (in this case, violation of a domestic protective order) 
because they are direct consequences. A failure to exercise her rights within 
30 days also has a direct consequence-her right is forever extinguished! There 
is no real difference between the sentence imposed and the direct 
consequence of extinguishment, since they are both inevitable. They directly 
flow from an act or omission to act. 
The statement in the plea form is ambiguous, confusing and 
misleading. Since the clause "as long as the request is in writing and for good 
cause shown" comes after the "within 30 days of today's date", one can 
reasonably conclude that the written motion does not have to come within 30 
days of the entry of the plea. It is the court that has misplaced the clause, 
since it is the court's form, and any ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion 
created falls on the trial court. If an affidavit is used to aid Rule 11 
compliance and creates any ambiguity or uncertainty, it must be addressed 
during the plea hearing. The trial court must conduct an inquiry to establish 
that the defendant understands the affidavit and voluntarily signed it. Any 
omissions or ambiguities in the affidavit must be clarified during the plea 
hearing, as must any uncertainties raised in the course of the colloquy. State 
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v. Abeyta, 852 P.2d 993,996 (Utah 1993); State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216 
(Utah 1992); State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Also, 
Gibbons, supra, and State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119,1123, (Utah 1991). 
Defendant raised there arguments in the trial court and alleged that 
there was a violation of due process, equal protection and the plea was 
involuntary. The trial court made no ruling regarding the aforementioned 
contentions, since it concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear and decide 
the matter because of the 77-13-6 violation as expressed in Price. Defendant 
reasserts the aforementioned contentions and respectfully requests that the 
Appellate Court decide said issues. 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE 
The Due Process Clauses, in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
provide substantive protection when fundamental rights are involved. If 
fundamental rights are affected by the legislation or the class itself is suspect, 
the strict scrutiny test is used to test validity. The legislation will be held 
invalid unless it is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. A 
more difficult test than the rational relationship standard, where economic or 
social legislation is involved. 
The 30-day limitation involves the withdrawal of a fundamental right to 
access the court against a suspect class. Since only criminal defendants who 
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have entered guilty pleas are involved, the presumption is that it is invalid 
unless it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Whether or not a 
fundamental right or privilege is being abridged is itself a substantive 
question. It seems self-evident that the extinguishment of a criminal 
defendant's access to the trial court is an abridgement of a fundamental right 
and privilege, since it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty that a 
defendant be able to access the trial judge. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319 (1947). Where the rights and privileges of a criminal defendant are 
involved, the courts have recognized that fundamental fairness is in issue and 
the strictest scrutiny is the measure used. One's freedom is at stake and 
freedom is the essence of our society. The court is the vanguard of freedom in 
our tripartite system. Due process goes further than protecting the rights 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and reaches various rights not expressly 
states in the Constitution. For example, that proof in a criminal case is 
"beyond a reasonable doubt". In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) 
Since the 30-day rule applies only in criminal cases and only to plea 
criminal defendants, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause is 
also involved in analyzing the constitutionality of 77-13-6 and Rule 11. Since 
the fundamental right to access the trial court is being severely limited and 
shortened to a mere 30 days, said right is subject to "strict scrutiny". Also, 
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since only criminal defendant's who have pled guilty are singled out, it is a 
suspect class. The limitation violates equal protection unless found to be 
necessary to a compelling state interest and it cannot be accomplished by a 
less drastic alternative. San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989); 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991); J.J.N.P. Co. v State, ETC 
655P.2d 1133 .In other words, the same test applies under equal protection 
and due process-"strict scrutiny". Utah Public Employees Association v. 
State, 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1980) 
Under any test, 1) rational relationship, 2) substantially related to an 
important legislative interest or 3) strict scrutiny that necessary to promote 
compelling state interest, the 30 day rule is too drastic and too short of a 
period, and a less extreme period (90 to 180 days) would accomplish the 
purpose of the legislation. Although defendant urges that the strict scrutiny 
standard should apply in the present fact pattern, 77-13-6 does not pass the 
least demanding "any rational basis" test. There is an abuse of legislative 
discretion since there is no rational basis for a 30-day limitation. Withdrawing 
access to the court violates the "open door policy of Utah. Condemarin v. 
University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 377(Utah 1989); Berry ex rel. v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). 
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The letter from Carvel R. Harward, Chief Criminal Deputy, to James 
Housley, notes that there was no time limit on a motion to withdraw and that 
after a reasonable time evidence is far more difficult to preserve. (TC, Pages 
103, 104,105). Then, he summarily concludes that 30 days is a reasonable 
period of time to allow for a withdrawal of plea, since defendant can always 
appeal or file for an extraordinary writ under Utah Code Ann. 78-35a-101 et. 
seq., The Post Convictions Remedies Act. He believes imprisoned defendants 
should resort to habeas corpus petitions rather than a motion to withdraw. 
The problem with the Post Conviction Remedies Act is that a defendant must 
first exhaust his right to appeal before he can qualify for relief, making the 
remedy impractical and unmanageable. The statute of limitations under the 
Post Convictions Remedies Act, yet it is designed to cover the same wrongs 
as the motion to withdraw, and is a one year statute, not thirty days. (7 8-3 5 a-
107) 
The statute of limitations for habeas corpus is one year as well. See 78-
35a-107. In Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 848 (Utah 1998), the Supreme Court 
stated that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing petitioner's habeas 
corpus petition without first considering whether the interests of justice 
excused the petitioner's failure to file within the one-year statute of 
limitations. In other words, the court has the discretion to go beyond the one-
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year limitation, but no discretion where a motion to withdraw or extend is 
involved, and the period is a mere 30 days. An appeal is far more 
complicated than a petition for habeas corpus or motion to withdraw and is 
directed to an appellate court, not the trial judge. It is not an adequate 
substitute for habeas corpus or a motion to withdraw. As the letter admits, the 
preference is to allow a trial judge an opportunity to review his own rulings 
before the matter is removed to a higher level. Most importantly, there is no 
reason given nor is there any rational basis for placing a short 30 day limit on 
a jurisdictional statute that imposes a substantial burden on criminal 
defendants, many of whom are incarcerated and have limited ability and 
resources to discover substantially all of the errors that may have been made 
at the trial level. 
Since many of the defendants who are part of the class affected are 
incarcerated, the 30-day limit invidiously discriminates against them without 
any rational basis for such discrimination. The overwhelming majority of 
evidence and witnesses are available beyond 30 days and no reason is 
specifically given for choosing such a period. Comparing the time periods 
with the rest of the states, which average six months and in many cases 
longer, the 30-day period is patently unreasonable and the burden has shifted 
to the legislation to demonstrate that thirty days is the appropriate means and 
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classification period to achieve the legislative objective of placing a time limit 
to give finality to the decision and protect the prosecution from its stale 
evidence claim. 
The letter dated February 17, 1989, to the attorney general, (asking that 
the constitutionality be examined) and the response letter of Assistant 
Attorney General Stanley H. Olsen, dated February 23, 1989, which states 
that "our brief review indicates no patent constitutional flaw or legal 
deficiency" illustrates the cursory analysis that was given to the 
constitutionality of the legislation. (TC, Pages 106, 107, 108, 109). In other 
words, former deputy Stanley H. Olsen, assumed the thirty day limitation was 
rational because it came from the Governor's office and the legislature. 
The shortness of time between the letters itself (February 17 and 
February 23 and February 17, 1989 is a Friday, therefore only three business 
days elapsed) demonstrates that only a cursory or no constitutional evaluation 
ever took place. Had an evaluation occurred and had there been a comparison 
to other states, it would be obvious that the thirty-day period is too short to be 
anything other than unreasonable, without any rational basis for the short 
period. If the state cannot account for its own witnesses and evidence beyond 
thirty days, our entire system of criminal justice must be reexamined. The 
fundamental rights of a defendant must not be sacrificed for the prosecutor's 
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sophistry of alleged lost evidence. The prosecution's shortcomings are not a 
rational reason to severely abridge the defendant's ability to access the trial 
judge who pronounced judgment. Furthermore, it is prudent and logical to 
allow the trial court a chance to review its own decision before forcing the 
defendant to move to the next level of review. Six months to one year is a 
rational period. Since one can assume that errors will be made, it is 
reasonable to allow sufficient time to discover any errors and bring them to 
the attention of the trial judge. The trial court deserves the confidence that it 
can correct its own errors, if a sufficient chance is permitted. Thirty days is 
too short to be a genuine opportunity for the trial judge and the defendant to 
address the multitude of errors that may arise in the course of a guilty plea 
entry. 
In researching the time period for vacating or withdrawing a guilty plea 
and similar procedures nationwide, Utah is the shortest period for such a 
procedure, highlighting the arbitrary determination that 30 days is reasonable. 
For example, some states only require that a postjudgment motion to change 
or withdraw a plea be seasonably made. Whether or not the motion is 
seasonable is determined by the trial judge. See People v. Castaneda, 37 
Cal. App.4th 1612,44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666 (Cal. App.l Dist. 1995) for an 
exposition of the better view. The majority of states allow a defendant at least 
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six months to withdraw his guilty plea. Under any view, Utah's 30-day 
limitation is without any rational basis and a comparison to other states 
demonstrates the Utah aberration and anomaly. 
ENIGMATIC LANGUAGE OF STATE v. PRICE 
Since the trial judge ruled that she had no jurisdiction to hear and 
decide the motion to extend and to withdraw because of State v Price, 
837P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), it is appropriate to consider that case. (TC, 
Page 161). The baffling language of Price, supra at 583, states "This is the 
first time this court has considered the application of the thirty-day filing 
period in section 77-13-6(2)(b) when the record shows that a defendant was 
informed of the thirty-day deadline. If the timeliness issue had been properly 
addressed in the trial court, that court would have been without jurisdiction to 
hear defendant's motion and without a basis for extending the time for 
defendant to file his motion." In other words, where the defendant is 
advised of the thirty-day rule, pursuant to 77-13-6(2)(b), the trial court 
has no jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw and extend the time to 
file the motion to withdraw pursuant to Price. However, the legislature 
created Rule 11(6), now Rule 11(f), which states "(f) Failure to advise the 
defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, 
no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea aside, 
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but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under 
Section 77-13-6." (Emphasis added) 
Despite such language the Price court summarily concludes, without 
clearly stating any reason for its conclusion, that the trial court is divested of 
jurisdiction to hear a motion to withdraw and without a basis for extending 
the time for a defendant to file his motion in all cases where a defendant is 
advised of the 30 day rule, forcing an appeal or petition for habeas corpus. In 
essence, the Price court has judicially eliminated what the legislature created-
a ground for extending the time to make a motion under 77-13-6 in the trial 
court, which is the plain meaning of the last clause in Rule 11(f). Although 
the Price court states that Rule 11 must be read in conjunction with 77-13-6, 
it then cancels the defendant's right to proceed under Rule 11(f) in the trial 
court. There is no discussion of statutory intent and interpretation, ignoring 
that entire litany of cases. Such judicial interpretation is without precedence 
and violates the separation of power doctrine. Simply stated, the Price case 
does not explain its rationale and is inconsistent with the clear plain meaning 
of the statute (77-13-6) and the rule (Rule 11(f)). It literally eliminates the 
defendant's right to a review in the trial via a motion to withdraw or extend. 
Coupled with the short 30-day rule of limitation, such deprivation violates due 
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process, is invidiously discriminatory and distastefully repugnant to a concept 
of ordered liberty. 
In James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, at 572-3, (Utah App. 1998), Price 
is criticized since the court states that "We believe that Conerly and the cases 
from the other jurisdictions holding that statutes of limitation are not 
jurisdictional are the better reasoned cases." Price needs to be explained, 
overruled and partially modified rather than merely criticized. Particularly, "If 
the timeliness issue had been properly addressed the trial court, that 
court would have been without jurisdiction to hear defendant's motion 
and without a basis for extending the time for defendant to file his 
motion.", needs to be deleted because it is erroneous, not the better view and 
violates due process, equal protection and the separation of power clauses of 
the U.S. and State of Utah Constitutions. Furthermore, no rationale is stated 
and the aforementioned sentence is judicial dicta and not a decisive utterance. 
Lastly, the litany of statutory interpretation is not mentioned and the entire 
relevant area is not even considered. Frankly, the case is very much a judicial 
embarrassment. It needs to be changed. It has led to a plethora of decisions, 
such as the one made by the trial judge in the instant case, and has caused an 
additional work load to fall on the appellate courts that was not intended 
when the 30-day limit of 77-13-6 was added. 
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CONSEQUENCE OF DEPORTATION 
In State v. McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, at 1305, (Utah App. 1994) the 
Utah Appellate Court held that whether or not a plea is voluntary is 
unaffected by collateral consequences such as possible deportation, while 
recognizing that erroneous advice regarding deportation and ineffective 
counsel are exceptions to the doctrine. 
It is respectfully submitted that said case needs to modified or 
overruled because the rationale underlying the doctrine is based on an 
unsupportable legal fiction, it is anachronistic and out of step with today's 
realities and the doctrine is confused and has been misapplied to attorneys, 
although originally intended to apply only to the courts. 
Firstly, direct and collateral consequence doctrine was judicially 
created to deal with the issue of overcrowded court calendars and to limit the 
court's responsibility to a criminal defendant. The collateral consequence 
doctrine originally stated that trial judges did not have to inform defendants of 
all the possible effects of criminal convictions, but only the direct 
consequences. This doctrine was based on the rationale that because such a 
wide variety of potential consequences exist, one could not expect judges to 
warn defendants about every possible result of conviction. For example, the 
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judge has no duty to inform a defendant that conviction of a felony involves 
the temporary loss of the right to vote. However, the penalty and sentence are 
direct consequences of the guilty plea, therefore the judge has a duty to 
inform the defendant of these consequences. Most of the state law is based on 
the federal law in the area. 
In United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787, (2d Cir. 1973), the 
Second Circuit elaborated on the difference between direct and collateral 
consequences. The court stated that the distinction depends upon the degree 
of certainty with which the sanctions affect defendants. Id, at 789-90. In 
Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466, (2d Cir. 1974) the Second 
Circuit added that if the punishment is meted out by another agency, such as 
INS, judges need not inform defendants of such possibilities, even if 
deportation amounts to an absolute certainty after conviction. However, 
regardless of what agency doles out the punishment, if the consequence is 
virtually a certainty, it is not collateral and to conclude that it is begs the 
question and is pure language sophistry. It is a direct consequence because it 
is a substantial certainty. A deportation OSC and hearing has been filed 
against the defendant and is pending, and she faces the consequence of 
deportation based on her plea to the violation of the domestic violence 
protective order. For this defendant, facing deportation is a real consequence. 
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Secondly, the immigration law has significantly changed since McFadden, 
supra, was decided in 1994. Under the former law, a judge could recommend 
to INS that an alien not be deported, although convicted of a criminal offense. 
The law has been changed and a trial judge no longer has that discretion. 
Another recent change permits INS to deport an alien for violation of a 
protective order. Therefore, failing to advice an alien defendant about 
deportation ignores the fact that the consequence of deportation is extremely 
severe and frequently more important than the criminal consequence. An alien 
can be deported and forced to leave the country for the de minimus act of 
violation of a domestic protective order. There are serious due process 
problems with the anachronistic view that deportation is a collateral 
consequence, and the court wants to acknowledge the realities that currently 
exist. 
Lastly, when the collateral consequence doctrine originated it was only 
applied to the court, then, out of confusion and lack of precision, the doctrine 
was erroneously applied to attorneys as well. It is clear that there are 
significant differences between the duties owed by the court and by the 
attorney to the defendant. The differences were extensively covered in the 
briefs tendered to the trial court. (Please see TC, Pages 72-77) The attorney 
has a duty to advice his alien client of the possible deportation consequence 
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of the guilty plea, although the court may not have such a duty. The 
considerations and standards for the court and the attorney are substantially 
different and should reflect the essential differences of the different duties 
owed to the defendant. 
The undersigned, as an Adjunct Professor of Immigration Law and 
immigration expert, testified in the evidentiary hearing that McFadden, supra, 
ought to be overruled or modified in the light of changes that occurred in the 
law since 1994. (RT, Page 178, page 61, lines 9-12). Also, as to the standard 
of care, the undersigned further testified that he is on retainer with the Salt 
Lake Public Defender's Office, and that the Defender's Office and attorneys 
throughout the state regularly call him and ask him to analyze the specific 
immigration consequences as they impact an alien criminal defendant. (RT, 
Page 178, page 65, lines 8-15). The testimony shows that the local and 
statewide legal community is concerned and considers the immigration 
consequences of a criminal plea, therefore the right to effective counsel via 
the Sixth Amendment is within the scope of the duty that the lawyer owes to 
the criminal defendant, particularly within Salt Lake County. In other words, 
the standard of care that an attorney owes to a criminal alien defendant 
includes advising defendant as to the immigration impact of her criminal case. 
Learned experts agree that the better view is that deportation consequences 
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are within the scope of the duty that the attorney owes to the client. Some 
states have statutorily extended that duty to include the trial judges as well. 
Please see defendant's trial brief on this point.(TC, Page 72-4). Furthermore, 
the undersigned also testified that Judge Lynn Davis of the Fourth District 
asked him to draft a statement that he could use in the sentencing of aliens. 
(RT, Page 178, pages 71-72, lines 15-24 and 1-15, respectively). Therefore, 
some trial judges have already begun to acknowledge and accept the duty 
owed to alien defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The cumulative errors of failure to advice of the right to a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury, the omission to advice the defendant of the 
minimum sentence and lack of establishing the foundation facts of the 
elements of violation of a protective order were clearly harmful to the 
defendant. Add the ineffectiveness of counsel, that the plea was involuntary, 
the lack due process and equal protection, and the court of review can readily 
see that there was no fair and adversarial trial was given to the defendant. The 
fact that one cannot have confidence in the outcome of the case seems to be 
the inescapable conclusion. 
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Defendant respectfully requests that this court reverse the trial court's 
denial of her motion to extend the time within which to file a motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea and to withdraw her guilty be reversed, that the 
thirty day limitation be declared unconstitutional, and that State v. McFadden 
and State v. Price be modified, amended and reversed as suggested herein. 
Respectfully submitted, this n day of October, 1999. 
Lynn C. McMurray 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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U. S, Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
IL S. Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice 
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of 
a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such 
state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number 
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United 
States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, 
to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay 
any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 
held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
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Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law,] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, 
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by 
statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined 
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
76-5-201. Criminal homicide — Elements — Designations of offenses. 
(1) (a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with 
criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the 
offense, causes the death of another human being, including an unborn child. 
(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of an unborn 
child caused by an abortion. 
(2) Criminal homicide is aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, child abuse homicide, 
homicide by assault, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide. 
77-13-6 Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and 
with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be 
made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
78-35a-101 Short title. 
This act shall be known as the f?Post-Conviction Remedies Act." 
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Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Auailabilitx of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on 
any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on 
personal liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or 
corporate authority) or paragraph id) (involving the wrongful use of judicial 
authority, the failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of 
Pardons and Paroie ' . There shall be no special form of writ. Except for 
instances governed by Rule 65C. the procedures in this rule shall govern 
proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule 
does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary 
relief shall be governed by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall 
govern all petitions claiming tha t a person has been wrongfully restrained of 
personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this 
paragraph. 
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(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition 
with the clerk of the court m the district in which the petitioner is restrained 
or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a 
short, plain s ta tement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks 
relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place where the person is 
restrained. It shall s tate the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by the 
petitioner. It shall s ta te whether the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief 
in the prior proceeding The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal 
process available to the petitioner that resulted m restraint. The petitioner 
shall also at tach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner 
in any prior proceeding tha t adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument 
or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in 
a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent 
to the court t ha t the legahtv of the restraint has alreadv been adjudicated in 
a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall 
appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing 
the claim, s ta t ing tha t the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for this 
conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions oi law The 
order shall be sent bv mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall 
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous 
on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the 
petition and a copy of anv memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the 
same time, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or 
otherwise respond to the petition, bpecifying a time within which the respon-
dent must comply If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an 
order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the 
legality of the res t ra int . An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the 
respondent has res t ra ined the person alleged to have been restrained, whether 
the person so res t ra ined has been transferred to any other person, and if so, 
the identitv of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or 
authority for the transfer Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to 
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive 
motion. 
(7) Temporal relief If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained 
will be removed from the cour ts jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury 
before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue 
a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be 
dealt with according to law Pending a determination of the petition, the court 
may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such 
other persons as mav be appropriate 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order If the respondent cannot be 
found, or if it appears tha t a person other than the respondent has custody of 
the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and anv other process 
issued bv the court mav be served on the person having custody in the manner 
and with the ^ame effect as if tha t person had been named as respondent in the 
action 
(9) Avoidance of service b\ respondent If anyone having custodv of the 
person alleged to be res t ra ined avoids service of the hearing order or attempts 
wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall 
immediately ar res t the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring 
the person ar res ted before the court to be dealt with according to law 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a 
hearing, the court shall hea r the mat ter in a summary fashion and shall render 
mdgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall 
appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons tor 
failing to do so. The court mav nevertheless direct the respondent to bring 
before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right 
to be present at the hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order 
accordingly. The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect ol torm or 
any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the 
meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent. 
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who mav petition the court: s>ecuntv. The attorney general may, and 
when directed to do so bv the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the 
grounds enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is not required to be 
represented bv the attornev general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one 
of the acts enumerated in subparagraph i2) of this paragraph may petition the 
court under this paragraph if i A) the person claims to be entitled to an office 
unlawfully held bv another or iB) if the attorney general fails to file a petition 
under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A Pj*1*™11 
filed by a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by 
an undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay anv judgment for costs and 
damages that mav be recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The 
sureties shall be in the lorm tor bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 13 
(2) G/ ounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted. (A) where a person 
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether 
civil or mihtarv, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the 
authority of the'state of Utah: i B) where a public officer does or permits any act 
that results in a forfeiture of the office. iC) where persons act as a corporation 
in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated: (D) where any 
corporation has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, 
alteration or renewal of corporations, or (E) where any corporation has 
forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or franchises 
(3) Proceedings on the petition On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, 
or mav issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the 
hearing on the merits The court mav also grant temporary relief in accordance 
with the terms of Rule 65A 
(d) Wrongful use of juaiciat autlwnt\ oi failuie to comply uith dut\ actions 
bv board of pardons and par ote 
(1) Who ma\ petition A person aggne\ ed or whose interests are threatened 
by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court tor 
rPiiet 
(2) Giounds for relief ADpropnate relief may be granted (A) where an 
inferior court, administrate e agencv. or officer exercising judicial functions 
has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. (B) where an inferior 
court, administrative agenc\ corporation or person has failed to perform an act 
required bv law as a dun ot office, trust or station. tC) where an inferior court, 
administrative agencv corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use 
or enjoyment of a right or office to w hich the petitioner is entitled, or i D) where 
the Board of Pardons and Parole has* exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to 
perform an act required b\ constitutional or statutory law 
(3) Proceedings on the petition On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, 
or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the 
hearing on the merits The court mav direct the inferior court, administrative 
agencv officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to 
the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings The court may also 
grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A 
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(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, 
the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993; July 1, 1996.) 
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Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arra ignment , except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
- 1 0 -
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(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and mav not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel: 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impart ial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and tha t bv entering the plea, these rights are waived: 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements ot the otfense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes tha t the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction: 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, wrhat agreement has been reached. 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for films anv motion to 
withdraw the plea, and 
(8) the defendant has oeen advised that the right of appeal is limited 
These findings mav be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, an affidavit reciting these factors after the court has established 
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the 
affidavit. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be 
sufficient tha t the affidavit has been read or translated to the defendant 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing anv motion to 
withdraw a plea of guiltv. no contest or guilty and mentallv ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but mav be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6 
(g)(1) If it appears t ha t the prosecuting attorney or any other partv has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally tha t anv recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
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(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement 
and the reasons for it. in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge 
may then indicate to the prosecuting attornev and defense counsel whether the 
proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the mdge then decides that final disposition should not be in confor-
mity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
ii) With approval oi the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant mav enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill. or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentallv ill. in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. ^ T7-16a-103. 
(Amended effective Mav 1. 1993; January 1. 1996: November 1. 1997.) 
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions: other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a persons character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a par t icular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same: 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same, or evidence of a character t rai t of peacefulness of the victim offered by 
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the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the 
first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identitv, 
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this 
rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; February 11, 1998.) 
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